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VThis paper is a revised version of one given in a lecture in Canberra, Australia,
in 1986. he deep ecology movement will thrive whatever professional 
hilosophers like myself publish about their conception of it. Perhaps 
hat I say about it is expressed in a way that is not natural for many of 
ts warm supporters. But we cannot expect, or even wish, to have a 
ingle way of expressing ourselves. I have mine. 
 
upporters of the deep ecology movement refer approvingly to a 
iversity of philosophers, cultural traditions and religious trends. Some 
uthors ask for clarification: Where is the essence or core? Is there a 
efinite general philosophy of deep ecology, or at least a kind of 
hilosophy? Or is it essentially a movement with exasperatingly vague 
utlines? 
 
 do not think it is desirable to do more than tentatively suggest what 
ight be the essential ingredients of a deep ecology theoretical point of 
iew. In what follows I make some remarks which are formulated in a 
ay that might be considered dogmatic. They are, however, only meant 
s proposals for people with a background similar to my own. 
 
n order to facilitate discussion about deep ecology among 
hilosophers, it may be helpful to distinguish a common platform of 
eep ecology from the fundamental features of philosophies and 
eligions from which that platform is derived, provided it is tentatively 
ormulated as a set of norms and hypotheses (factual assumptions). The 
erm platform is preferred to principle because the latter may be 
isunderstood to refer to ultimate premises. Furthermore, the 
ormulations of a platform should be short and concise (as a synopsis), 
hereas the fundamental premises are Buddhist, Taoist, Christian, or of 
ther religious kinds, or they are philosophical with affinities to the 
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basic views of Spinoza, Whitehead, Heidegger, or others. Different sets 
of fundamentals are normally more or less incompatible, or at least 
difficult to compare in terms of cognitive contents. Supporters of deep 
ecology may have great difficulties in understanding each other's 
ultimate views, but not sets of penultimate ones as formulated as a kind 
of platform they have largely in common. 
  
The platform of the deep ecology movement can be grounded in 
religion or philosophy, including ethics. It can also be said to be derived 
from these fundaments. As used here, the term “derived” is open to a 
variety of interpretations. If the validity of a norm or a hypothesis is 
justified by reference to one definite set of assumptions of a 
philosophical or religious kind, the norm or hypothesis is in a sense 
derived from those assumptions. The set acquires a character of 
premises for particular conclusions. But closely similar or even 
identical conclusions may be drawn from divergent or even 
incompatible premises. This explains in a natural way that diversity of 
views at the deepest level can be felt by some to be bewildering and 
makes deep ecology too vague to deserve analytical scrutiny. 
  
One must avoid looking for one definite philosophy or religious view 
among the supporters of the deep ecology movement. There is a rich 
manifold of fundamental views compatible with the deep ecology 
platform. And without this, the movement would lose its transcultural 
character. The transcultural character of the movement makes it natural 
that the wording of a version of the platform cannot be the same 
everywhere. A term like “our planet,” for instance, is unsuitable where 
people do not have any clear notion corresponding to the Western 
concept of a planet. 
  
The discussion has four levels to take into account: verbalized 
fundamental philosophical and religious views; the deep ecology 
platform; the more or less general consequences derived from the 
platform—guidelines for life styles and for policies of every kind; and, 
lastly, prescriptions related to concrete situations and dateable decisions 
made in them. The term “dateable” refers to the trivial circumstance 
that a decision is made at a definite time even if it has taken a year to 
arrive at. 
  
From the point of view of derivation one may use the following 
diagram, usually called the Apron diagram. The direction of derivation 
proceeds down the page, as is usual, and convenient. But some may 
prefer the opposite: having the roots on the deepest level at the bottom 
of the page and letting the other levels develop like the branches of a 
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tree. Still others would prefer a more holistic or artistic illustration 
avoiding straight lines, preferring circles. The root may be conceived in 
terms of the premise/conclusion relation or in terms of psychological or 
social motivation, or in terms of some other relations. The Apron is a 
premise/conclusion diagram.  
 
The Apron Diagram
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Level 1: Ultimate 
premise, worldviews and 
ecosophies
Level 2: Deep ecology 
platform principles
 
 
 
 
 
The Apron diagram is of a rather abstract nature. Why not give an 
example of a justification of a concrete action formulated in terms of 
the apron? Let NN be a mythical person, a supporter of the deep 
ecology movement, living somewhere near the unique old growth 
forests of the Northwestern United States of America. He happens to 
have fundamental beliefs of a Spinozistic kind, but has no knowledge of 
Spinoza. One early Monday he spikes some trees, puts up some posters 
clearly announcing that trees in the neighbourhood are spiked. I use NN 
as an example of how he, in principle, not in practice, makes use of the 
Apron diagram. The concrete action of spiking is chosen because of its 
Level 3: Normative or 
factual hypotheses and 
policies 
Level 4: Particular 
decisions and actions 
Deep Ecology Platform 
Logical 
Derivation Questioning 
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controversial character. Some supporters do not find the spiking 
procedure justifiable. Exactly where is the disagreements to be located? 
 
Example 
 
Level 1 A set of ultimate Spinozist premises
 
Level 2   N & H  The 8 point platform principles of DEM 
    
 
 
H1         H 
 
 
 
 
 
        N  
        & 
Level 3        H 
         
 
         
 H        N 
irect actions 
ould be non-
olent 
ll normal means 
 stop it have 
en tried but 
ve failed    
pporters of 
EM living near 
and considering 
iking should 
rticipate      
          & 
        H 
 
 
 
            N 
        & 
        H 
Level 4 
 
        H 
         
        N 
The logging at P 
decreases 
richness & 
diversity & is not 
necessary to 
satisfy vital needs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Logging at P 
should be stopped 
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Abbreviations: N – norm; H – hypothesis; DE
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Logging at P is 
illegal 
 
 
 
 
Treespiking, pro-     
perly done, is non-   
violent and may 
contribute to stop    
logging   
 
Treespiking at P is 
justifiable and 
urgent 
 
 
 
I, NN, satisfy the      
above conditions.     
I could start 
Monday  
 
It is now Monday 
 
(NN:) Spike! M – deep ecology movement; NN – a person 
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In assessing constructive criticism of deep ecology as a form of 
activism it is useful to try to find out which level is involved. An 
example: In the introduction to his the Ethics of Environmental 
Concern (Oxford: Blackwell 1983), Robin Attfield says:  
 
I do not accept, with the so-called ‘deep, long-range ecology movement,’ the view 
that our principal loyalty should be focussed not on fellow-humans or fellow 
creatures but on the biosphere as an organic whole, . . . 
  
I suppose there are some supporters of the deep ecology movement who 
propose focussing loyalty on the biosphere as an organic whole in the 
sense suggested by Attfield. The conception of the biosphere as an 
organic whole and of such a kind of loyalty belongs to the realm of 
metaphysics, that is level one, rather than to the other levels. Therefore, 
the fact that Attfield does not accept the view he describes, is not 
relevant in argumentation for or against the deep ecology movement. 
You may or may not have your principal loyalty focussed on the 
biosphere as an organic whole, you cannot even be sure what is meant 
by the terms. One main point in deep ecology is the deep 
argumentation, that is, argumentation from ultimate (philosophical, 
religious) premises, but there is room for very different sets of such 
premises. 
  
If the view outlined by Attfield seemed to be implicit in deep ecology 
views on level 2 platform principles, his non-acceptance would amount 
to a non-acceptance of something basic in the deep ecology movement 
(in so far as it is verbally articulated). If the view seemed to be implicit 
in views belonging to level 3, this would also be relevant to acceptance 
of deep ecology, and the same applies to level 4. Attfield could mean 
that, on the whole, decisions made or advocated by supporters of deep 
ecology platform seem to imply the view he does not accept. Perhaps, 
perhaps not. 
  
Conclusion: distinction of levels is useful when trying to pin down 
exactly what a criticism is focussing on. 
 
The Apron Diagram furnishes only a static model. A supporter of the 
deep ecology movement will normally modify the sentences at the 
different levels from time to time. New information may change any 
hypotheses and therefore also change norms which, in part, have been 
justified on the basis of the hypotheses being changed. 
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New ethical or other intuitions may make the supporter change any 
norm. If a norm is changed, new sets of hypotheses are normally 
involved, and old ones are discarded. This again will cause 
reverberations in a smaller or greater part of the field. 
  
Example: Diprinzio, supporter of the deep ecology movement, reads the 
Canberra Times: Melbourne:  
  
Victoria's mountain people brought their own legend to Melbourne's 
streets today to show their anger about the State Government's plan to 
extend the Alpine National Parks.  
 
 The Alpine families arrived with their dogs, their drays 
and their stockwhips. 
 They rode in wagons or horseback wearing moleskins, 
bush hats and oilskins. 
 They provided one of the most colourful protests 
Melbourne has seen and were cheered by hordes of 
people lining the route to Parliament House. 
 The people of the high country say the Government's 
plan threatens to destroy their heritage and the future of 
the 120 families who have been grazing cattle in the 
Alps for the past 150 years. 
 
The article and a most touching picture make this staunch supporter of 
deep ecology exclaim, “Yes, we cannot do this to the 120 families, the 
plan must be fought, today! I join the demonstration!” His decision is of 
a kind that belongs to level 4. But he soon realizes that it may go 
against a lot of his own norms and hypotheses of level 2 and level 3. 
The deep ecology platform clearly implies a “No!” if Diprinzio does not 
start to make changes at level 3. He feels that his tentative “Yes” might 
not touch the platform formulations if he makes proper changes to level 
3 hypotheses. So he sees what can be done at level 3. There he finds 
hypotheses about compensation to people in similar awkward situations 
as the mountain people. He also tries to clarify and assess his position 
in general. After some reflection he reverses his conclusion: The plan 
should be upheld, but he decides to study it more carefully. 
  
From a point of view of normative systematizations, what goes on when 
changes are made at one or more levels is rather complicated. But part 
of it is processes of derivation. The Apron Diagram pretends only to 
illustrate important differences of the levels of derivation and the 
specific character of level 2. It represents a condensed formulation of 
the deepest level norms and hypotheses which most supporters of the 
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deep ecology movement can agree upon. This level is illustrated as the 
penultimate (next to ultimate) level of argumentation characteristic of 
those supporters of deep ecology who try to articulate their very basic 
views. At the third and fourth levels disagreements may arise. At the 
first level supporters with entirely different backgrounds disagree, or 
find each other's views more or less incomprehensible. 
  
A direction of derivation is not a measure of value priorities or of 
ethical priorities. And it does not imply that what is derived is a means 
in relation to what it is derived from. A simple example is enough to 
clarify this. From “Do not kill humans!” follows, if you concede “All 
mothers are humans,” the conclusion “Do not kill your mother!” This 
rather concrete norm is here derived from the more general and abstract 
one. But this does not imply that humans in general have a higher value 
or a kind of priority in relation to mothers. It does not say that in a norm 
conflict you should be more careful not to kill humans than not to kill 
your mother. An absurd position! And lastly, it is rather strange to 
refrain from killing your mother as a means to a goal, namely not to kill 
humans. 
  
The formulations of level 2 have the character of proposals. It may turn 
out that proposals will differ substantially or show a natural diversity of 
terminological and conceptual idiosyncrasies. Unhappily, it is quite 
common, in a broad sense, to mix the logical relation of derivation with 
other relations. These are at least as important but, nevertheless, are 
different. 
  
Rather often the relation of justification, ethical or otherwise, coincides 
with the relation of derivation. Thus a general, more or less intuitive 
norm of “right to live and flourish” is adhered to by many people 
without considering exactly what the norm, taken so-called literally, has 
as consequences. Confronted with questions like “What about 
poisonous snakes?” or, “What about beetles eating our vegetables?” 
some will hesitate, but eventually take up a firm positive stand, 
justifying this by reference to the general norm. In such cases, the 
derivation relation coincides with the justification relation (for these 
people). Schematically: generally premise: “There is a right which 
every living being x has, in principle, to live and flourish.” Special 
premise: “y is a living being.” Conclusion: “There is a right which y has 
. . ..” The conclusion is ethically as well as syllogistically derived from 
the general premise. In spite of the many cases of such coincidences, 
the relations should be kept apart by people interested in philosophical 
articulation of deep ecology principles. 
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There is no point in trying to formulate a short (or long) version of level 
2 that all supporters of deep ecology would like. The most remarkable 
similarities of positions and attitudes belong to levels 3 and 4. There are 
typical shallow and typical deep argumentation patterns, and there are 
environmental policies and decisions in relation to which supporters of 
deep ecology show an astonishingly high level of agreement. 
  
Here is, slightly modified, an eight point proposal for level 2 published 
in Ecophilosophy VI, May 1984, p 5:  
 
1. The flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth has 
inherent value. The value of non-human life-forms is 
independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for 
human purposes. 
2. Richness and diversity of life forms are also values in 
themselves and contribute to the flourishing of human and non-
human life on Earth. 
3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity 
except to satisfy vital needs. 
4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a 
substantial decrease of the human population. The flourishing of 
non-human life requires such a decrease. 
5. Present human interference with the non-human world is 
excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening. 
6. In view of the foregoing points, policies must be changed. The 
changes in policies affect basic economic, technological, and 
ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be 
deeply different from the present and make possible a more 
joyful experience of the connectedness of all things. 
7. The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality 
(dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to 
an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a 
profound awareness of the difference between big and great. 
8. Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation 
directly or indirectly to participate in the attempt to implement 
the necessary changes. 
 
  
The 8 formulations are of course in need of clarification, elaboration, 
and comments. Some are offered on pp.5 – 7 in Ecophilosophy VI. Here 
they are, slightly modified: 
 
RE (1) Instead of biosphere we might use the term ecosphere in order to 
stress that we of course do not limit our concern to the life-forms in a 
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narrow sense. The term life is used here in a comprehensive non-
technical way to refer also to what biologists classify as non-living: 
rivers (watersheds), landscapes, cultures, ecosystems, the living earth. 
Slogans such as “Let the river live” illustrate the broader usage so 
common in many different cultures. Only in our Western schools the 
term living is firmly associated with science of biology.  
 
RE (2) So-called simple, lower, or primitive species of plants and 
animals contribute essentially to richness and diversity of life. They 
have value-in-themselves and are not merely steps towards the so-called 
higher or rational life forms. 
  
Complexity, as referred to here, is different from complication. Urban 
life may be more complicated than life in a natural setting without 
being more complex in the sense of multi-faceted quality. 
  
Why talk about diversity AND richness? Suppose humans interfere 
with an ecosystem to such a degree that 1000 vertebrate species are 
each reduced to a survival minimum. Clearly an unacceptable state of 
affairs. We demand abundance of interconnected habitats through 
“bridges.” The main point is that life on Earth may be excessively 
interfered with even if diversity is upheld.  
 
RE (3) This formulation is perhaps too strong. But considering the mass 
of proclamations about what humans have the right to, it may be 
sobering to announce a norm about what they have no right to. That is, 
take into account situations in which they cannot evoke and appeal to a 
right. The formulation is not intended to automatically condemn all 
actions to which we cannot invoke a right as wrong. 
  
The term "vital need" is left deliberately vague to allow for 
considerable latitude in judgment. Differences in climate and related 
factors, together with differences in the structures of societies as they 
now exist, need to be considered. Also the difference between a means 
to the satisfaction of the need and the need must be considered. If a 
whaler quits whaling he may risk unemployment under the present 
economic conditions. Whaling is for him an important means. But he 
and his boat are urgently needed in the control of overfishing and the 
use of barbarous methods. And the whaling nations are rich enough to 
finance such inspection, especially along the coasts of Third World 
countries. So there is not a question of vital need to kill whales. 
 
RE (4) The stabilization and reduction of the human population will 
take time. Interim strategies need to be developed. But this in no way 
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excuses the present complacency, the extreme seriousness of our 
current situation must first be realized. But the longer we wait, the more 
drastic will be the measures needed. Until deep changes are made, 
substantial decreases in richness and diversity are liable to occur: the 
rate of extinction of species will be ten to one hundred times greater 
than in any other period of earth history. 
  
It may validly be objected that if the present billions of humans deeply 
change their behaviour in the direction of ecological responsibility, 
non-human life could flourish. 
 
RE (5) People in the materially richest countries cannot be expected to 
reduce their excessive interference with the non-human world to a 
moderate level overnight. Less interference does not imply that humans 
should not modify some ecosystems as do other species. Humans have 
modified the earth and will probably continue to do so. At issue is the 
nature and extent of such interference. 
  
The fight to preserve and extend areas of wilderness or near-wilderness 
should continue and focus on the general ecological functions of these 
areas. Very large wilderness areas are required in the biosphere to allow 
for continued evolutionary speciation of animals and plants. Present 
designated wilderness areas are too small and too few. 
 
RE (6) Economic growth as conceived and implemented today by the 
industrial states is incompatible with (1) – (5). “Green” economists 
have to be consulted. 
  
Whereas “self-determination,” “decentralization,” “local community,” 
and “think globally, act locally,” will remain key terms in the ecology 
of human societies, nevertheless the implementation of deep changes 
requires increasingly global action in the sense of action across every 
border. And it often turns out that local communities or areas with 
scattered population are uncritically in favour of so-called development 
and must be forced to a more ecologically responsible policy by central 
authorities. There are important limits to decentralization of 
ecologically relevant decisions. 
  
Support for global action through non-governmental organizations 
becomes increasingly important. Many of these organizations are able 
to act globally "from grass roots to grass roots," thus avoiding negative 
government interference. 
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Cultural diversity today requires advanced technology, that is, 
techniques that advance the basic goals of each culture. So-called soft, 
intermediate, and alternative technologies are steps in this direction. 
What is called “advanced” technology rarely fits the name. 
 
RE (7) Some economists criticize the term “quality of life” because it is 
supposed to be vague. But on closer inspection, what they consider to 
be vague is actually the non-quantitative nature of the term. One cannot 
quantify adequately what is important for the quality of life as discussed 
here, and there is no need to do so. 
 
RE (8) There is ample room for different opinions about priorities: what 
should be done first, what next? What is more urgent? What is 
necessary as opposed to what is highly desirable? Differences of 
opinion do not exclude vigorous co-operation. “The frontier is long.” 
 
What is gained from tentatively formulating basic views shared today 
by most or all supporters of the deep ecology movement? Hopefully it 
makes it a little easier to localize the movement among the many 
alternative movements. Hopefully this does not lead to isolation but 
rather to even better co-operation with many other alternative 
movements. It might also make some of us more clear about where we 
stand, and more clear about which disagreements might profitably be 
reduced and which ones might profitably be sharpened. 
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